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Explaining Essences 
Michael J. Raven 
Abstract. This paper explores the prospects of combining two views. The 
first view is metaphysical rationalism (the principle of sufficient reason): 
all things have an explanation. The second view is metaphysical 
essentialism: there are real essences. The exploration is motivated by a 
conflict between the views. Metaphysical essentialism posits facts about 
essences. Metaphysical rationalism demands explanations for all facts. But 
facts about essences appear to resist explanation. I consider two solutions 
to the conflict. Exemption solutions attempt to exempt facts about 
essences from the demand for explanation. Explanation solutions attempt 
to explain facts about essences. I argue that exemption solutions are less 
promising than explanation solutions. I then consider how explanation 
solutions might be developed. I suggest that a “generative” approach is 
most promising. I tentatively conclude that the prospects for combining 
metaphysical rationalism and metaphysical essentialism turn on the 
viability of a generative approach. This sets the agenda for defending the 
combination as well as the more general project of explaining essences.  
This paper concerns two views. The first view is metaphysical rationalism. It is 
also known as the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). This is the view that all 
things have an explanation. The second view is metaphysical essentialism. This 
is the view that there are real essences, or facts about real essences.  
My aim is to explore the prospects of combining these views. 
Although their combination is not inevitable, it is still alluring. Metaphysical 
rationalism appeals to those wanting to explain all things. Metaphysical 
essentialism appeals to those wanting explanations by essence. For example, 
they might say electrons are negatively charged because it is part of their 
nature or essence. Each view’s allure can be traced back to certain explanatory 
desires. One might thus expect an affinity in their combination. 
But there is a conflict in combining the two views. Metaphysical 
essentialism posits facts about essences. Metaphysical rationalism demands 
explanations for these and all other facts. But facts about essences appear to 
resist explanation. If they do, they are counterexamples to the PSR. My focus 
will be on exploring this conflict and its implications.   
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A direct implication is for metaphysical rationalists. It concerns 
whether they can also accept metaphysical essentialism. But there are also 
broader implications. Anyone may think essences resist explanation but still 
wonder whether they are explainable. And the prospects for explaining them 
may affect whether to posit them. So we can expect implications for these 
general issues quite apart from one’s views on metaphysical rationalism.1  
The paper begins by clarifying metaphysical rationalism (§1) and 
metaphysical essentialism (§2). Then I describe their conflict (§3). I 
distinguish two kinds of solutions. Exemption solutions attempt to exempt facts 
about essences from the demand for explanation. I argue against two 
prominent exemption solutions (§4). This serves as an indirect argument for 
another kind of solution. Explanation solutions attempt to explain facts about 
essences. I sketch a “generative” approach to explaining essences (§5). Then I 
draw two tentative conclusions (§6). The first is that exemption solutions are 
unpromising. The second is that the prospects of explanation solutions turn 
on the viability of a generative approach. This sets the agenda for defending 
the combination as well as the more general project of explaining essences. 
 Metaphysical rationalism 
Metaphysical rationalism is the view that all things have an explanation. The 
view comes from antiquity. In the early modern period, Leibniz [1989: §§32-
33] formulated the view as the principle of sufficient reason (PSR):  
Our reasonings are based on two great principles, that of contradiction,...And 
that of sufficient reason, by virtue of which we consider that we can find no 
true or existent fact, no true assertion, without there being a sufficient 
reason why it is thus and not otherwise.   
The PSR was also prominent in Spinoza [1988], Du Châtelet [1740], Kant 
[1781/1997], Schopenhauer [1813/1974], and others. It is now prominent in 
Pruss [2006], Della Rocca [2010], Dasgupta [2016], and Amijee [2018]. 
                                                 
1 But it might prevent confusion to state my views. I have no inclination toward metaphysical 
rationalism. Curiosity led me to consider combining it with metaphysical essentialism, to 
which I am inclined. I am especially intrigued by the prospects of explaining essences.  
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The qualifier ‘metaphysical’ distinguishes metaphysical from 
epistemological rationalism. Metaphysical rationalism implies that all things 
have an explanation. This neither requires nor prevents these explanations to 
be knowable, let alone knowable independent of experience. So it neither 
implies nor contradicts epistemological rationalism, the view that beings like 
us can have non-trivial non-empirical knowledge. I will ignore epistemological 
rationalism and so the qualifier ‘metaphysical’ will hereafter be dropped.  
The core idea of the PSR is that all things have an explanation. This 
can be refined along at least four dimensions. One concerns the scope of ‘all’: 
is it unrestricted or restricted? Another concerns the range of ‘things’: is it 
objects, facts, events, or items of any sort? A third concerns the force of ‘have’: 
does it have modal force of some sort? And a fourth concerns the kind of 
‘explanation’: is it apriori, conceptual, metaphysical, or something else?  
Various PSRs may be distinguished over which loci they occupy along 
these dimensions. Some might be of special interest. Perhaps our interest is 
in which locus represents so-and-so’s view or deserves the honorific ‘PSR’. But 
I will not be concerned with these matters. My focus will be on a specific PSR: 
PSR   All facts have grounds. 
Like all versions of the PSR, this one is characterized by the locus it occupies 
along the four dimensions. Each loci can be motivated singly. But they can 
also be motivated together from the kind of explanation at issue.  
 Our PSR interprets ‘explanation’ as ground.2 Various notions of 
ground have been discussed. I have in mind a distinctively metaphysical kind 
of determinative explanation. It is familiar enough for only a brief overview.3  
We may first distinguish two ways to express ground. On the operator 
approach, ‘ground’ is an operator connecting a sentence stating what’s 
grounded to the sentences stating the grounds. On the relation approach, 
‘ground’ is a relational predicate expressing a relation between the grounded 
fact and the facts grounding it. The approaches have complementary virtues. 
                                                 
2 Della Rocca [2012], Dasgupta [2016], Levey [2016], Schnieder and Steinberg [2016], and 
Amijee [2018] may each (more or less plausibly) be read as formulating PSR with ground.   
3 See Raven [2015] for a more detailed overview of ground.  
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The operator approach is neutral over whether there is a relation of ground 
and, if so, what its relata are. The relation approach engages with the 
metaphysics of facts and their relations. There are subtler differences too. But 
my main points won’t be affected by sliding between them as convenient.  
We also distinguish full and partial ground. Consider some facts 
which ground another. Each helps ground the grounded fact even if no one 
of them by itself fully grounds it. But they all together fully ground it. A fact 
partially (or helps) ground another just in case it is among its full grounds. 
When I use ‘ground’ without qualification, I mean full ground.  
I also follow orthodoxy in taking partial ground to be a strict partial 
order: it is irreflexive (nothing helps ground itself) and transitive (if one fact 
helps grounds a second and the second fact helps ground a third, then the 
first helps grounds the third). So full ground will have variants of these 
properties too. These assumptions are controversial despite their orthodoxy. 
But I don’t expect these controversies to be relevant here.  
Our PSR interprets ‘have’ non-modally. A modal interpretation would 
say that all things must have an explanation. This has a scope ambiguity. One 
disambiguation is that, necessarily, all things have some or other explanation. 
Another disambiguation is that each thing necessarily has the explanation it 
has. The PSR is often taken to have one or both modal implications. But our 
non-modal interpretation implies neither and is compatible with both.4 
 Our PSR takes ‘things’ to range just over facts. This is required by 
taking the kind of explanation to be ground and by taking ground to relate 
facts. It also has an independent motivation. Ranging over facts excludes non-
fact items (e.g. ordinary objects, forces, fields, universals, tropes). The sense 
in which these can be explained often derives from explaining something else. 
To illustrate, consider a chair and ask, “What explains it?” One is tempted to 
answer, “What explains what about it? That it exists? Or that it is brown? Or 
that...?” The follow-up questions ask to explain that the chair is thus-and-so. 
They ask to explain some fact about it. A request to explain a non-fact item 
seems often, if not always, abbreviates a request to explain some fact about it.   
                                                 
4 Were we to interpret our PSR modally, it would concern metaphysical modality. This flows 
from the distinctively metaphysical kind of explanation at issue: ground. 
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 Our PSR interprets ‘all’ unrestrictedly. It concerns all items, whatever 
those may be. These turn out to be facts because the kind of explanation is 
ground. The unrestricted scope of our PSR derives from the kind of 
explanation at issue. It seems one may ask of a fact whether it is or is not 
grounded. And it would seem at first that nothing prevents this question from 
arising for any fact.5 This suggests that the PSR should be unrestricted. But I 
will later consider restricted versions of the PSR. They are best regarded as 
resulting from allowing exemptions to the unrestricted version.  
 Metaphysical essentialism 
Metaphysical essentialism is the view that there are essences. It does not say 
which essences there are. Sometimes specific views about essences are also 
labelled ‘essentialism’.6 But that is not how I will understand it. My 
understanding does not specify which essences there are. Essentialists all agree 
that there are essences even if they disagree over which there are.   
 The qualifier ‘metaphysical’ distinguishes metaphysical essentialism 
from anti-realist essentialism. Philosophers have meant many different things 
by ‘anti-realist’ and I won’t attempt to sort out what they did or should mean. 
What I have in mind derives from the old contrast between real and nominal 
essences.7 Nominal essences are definitions of words or ideas. Anti-realist 
essentialism is the view that the only essences there are are nominal. Real 
essences are definitions of items themselves. I take ‘item’ to be neutral over 
any entity. So items may include words or ideas along with persons, material 
objects, social kinds, numbers, and so on. I use ‘essence’ to refer to real 
essences and so the qualifier ‘metaphysical’ will hereafter be dropped.  
Essence concerns a distinctive kind of question. The question asks 
what some item is. It is not in general correct to answer by stating just any 
feature of that item. Suppose we ask what Socrates is. It is incorrect to answer 
that Socrates is snub-nosed. This is because it is no part of his identity or 
                                                 
5 Della Rocca [2010,2018] appeals to such considerations to defend an unrestricted PSR.  
6 The labelling is pernicious. For example, it can mask the invalidity of arguing against 
genders having essences by arguing that they do not have biological essences (Witt [1995]).  
7 The distinction is inspired by Locke [1689]. 
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nature to be snub-nosed. Socrates is not essentially snub-nosed. But, 
presumably, it is correct to answer that Socrates is human. It is part of his 
identity or nature to be human. Socrates is essentially human.   
Some essential features constitute what an item is whereas others are 
merely consequential (Fine [1994]). That Socrates is essentially human and 
mortal is consequential upon his being essentially human and his being 
essentially mortal. But that Socrates is essentially human is not consequential 
upon anything else. It is part of Socrates’s constitutive essence that he is 
human, but not that he is human and mortal. It is only part of his 
consequential essence that he is human and mortal. Consequential essence 
lends itself better to formal investigation than does constitutive essence. But 
constitutive essence is arguably the primary conception. I will have it in mind. 
An essentialist statement expresses that something is essentially thus-
and-so. An example is ‘Socrates is essentially human’. If Socrates is essentially 
human, then the essentialist statement ‘Socrates is essentially human’ is true. 
True essentialist statements may be called true essentialities.  
 A true essentiality is presumably made true by some state of reality. 
Such a state is an essentialist fact. It is controversial just what facts are in 
general. But before settling that controversy, we can still say that what makes 
a true essentiality true is the existence of a corresponding essentialist fact. 
 The contrast between true essentialities and essentialist facts tracks 
the operator and relational approaches to ‘ground’. Essentialist statements 
can be connected to others by sentential operators. In particular, essentialist 
statements can be combined with others by the ground operator. This allows 
us to express claims about true essentialities grounding or being grounded by 
other truths. By also recognizing essentialist facts, we may take them to be the 
relata of the relation of ground. This allows us to express claims about 
essentialist facts grounding or being grounded by other facts. Nothing 
important is obscured by sliding between these modes of expression. 
 Essentialism was first formulated as the view that there are essences. 
This reifies essences. A second formulation is that there are essentialist facts. 
This does not reify essences (if essences are not facts). It does, however, reify 
facts. One might doubt whether trading one reification for another is 
beneficial. But our conception of fact is thin. Facts are just states of reality. 
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Essentialist facts are among them. They are facts concerning items being 
essentially thus-and-so. These facts can but needn’t concern essences.8 So the 
second formulation is preferable for its neutrality over essences. Our setup 
also requires it. Our PSR ranges over facts. Our question concerns combining 
it with essentialism. This is a non-starter except on the second formulation. 
So our official version of essentialism is that there are essentialist facts. But I 
will sometimes use ‘essence’ for ‘essentialist fact’ for stylistic reasons. 
 There have been two broad essentialist traditions since antiquity. In 
the Platonic tradition, essences are somehow detached from the world. 
Essences are given “prior” to their worldly instances. The core idea manifested 
in Plato’s theory of Forms. A Form is an essence that participates in its 
instances while still transcending them. The paradigmatic cases of 
arithmetical or geometrical essences illustrate this. For example, the essence 
of cube (a “Platonic solid”) is to be a regular, convex polygon with six square 
faces meeting at each of its eight vertices. Cubes are what they are by 
participating in this essence. But the essence transcends its worldly 
instantiations. Perhaps there are other ways to develop the core idea. But 
however it is developed, it will somehow detach essences from their worldly 
instances.9 Essentialist facts are detached from the world. 
 In the Aristotelian tradition, essences are somehow embedded in the 
world. Essences are not prior (in the sense of the Platonic tradition) to their 
worldly instances. The core idea is that essences are as much a part of the 
world as their worldly instances. The paradigmatic cases of biological or 
artifactual essences illustrate this. For example, the essence of scissors is to be 
made for cutting. Scissors are what they are by being made for cutting. Their 
essence is somehow part of the world. Perhaps there are other ways to develop 
the core idea. But however it is developed, it will somehow embed essences in 
the world. Essentialist facts are embedded in the world. 
  Each tradition has its appeal. Those gripped by one may take it to 
apply uniformly to all essences. But uniformity is optional. Perhaps each 
                                                 
8 An essentialist fact might not concern essences if essences are eliminable (Raven [2016,2017]). 
9 Detachment requires clarification. A natural idea is to associate it with abstracta. But the 
details are fraught and deserve more discussion than I can provide here (although I discuss 
it elsewhere). My main points do not turn on the exact characterization of detachment. 
 
draft 12-Oct-18 
 8/29    
 
tradition applies to some essences but not others. Perhaps some essences do 
not fit well into either tradition.10 But sorting out each tradition’s extent is a 
matter for another time. My immediate concern is with how each tradition 
influences solutions to the conflict between rationalism and essentialism.   
 The conflict 
Essentialism recognizes essentialist facts. Rationalism requires explanations 
for these and all other facts. But essentialist facts appear to resist explanation. 
If so, then essentialist facts are counterexamples to the PSR. This is the 
conflict between essentialism and rationalism.  
 Solutions should be sensitive to the earlier distinction between 
constitutive and consequential essence. Part of Socrates’s consequential 
essence is that he is human and mortal. It is a consequential essentialist fact 
that Socrates is essentially human and mortal. This consequential essentialist 
fact has an explanation. Part of Socrates’s constitutive essence is that he is 
human. Another part is that he is mortal. One constitutive essentialist fact is 
that Socrates is essentially human. Another is that he is essentially mortal. 
These two constitutive essentialist facts together explain the consequential 
essentialist fact. Consequential essentialist facts are in general explained like 
this by constitutive essentialist facts. But our focus has been on constitutive 
essentialist facts. What, if anything, explains them?  
One answer is ‘Nothing’. Essentialist facts have no explanation. Non-
rationalists may give this answer.11 But it seems unavailable to rationalists. 
And yet some say that it is available after all. It is if essentialist facts are 
somehow “exempt” from the PSR’s demand for explanation.  
                                                 
10 Examples of such ill-fitting essences include social and artifactual essences. Elsewhere I 
discuss how a puzzle arises because these essences can seem at once embedded and detached.  
11 It is another matter whether the answer is correct. Glazier [2017: 2880] argues that it is 
incorrect. Roughly, his argument is that some essences are nonfundamental, but that this is 
so only if some essentialist facts have explanations.  
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Exemption solutions respond to the conflict by exempting essentialist 
facts from explanation.12 Nothing explains essentialist facts. But this not 
supposed to conflict with the PSR’s demand for explanation. The challenge 
is to account for how essentialist facts avoid the demand. Such an account 
will restrict the scope of ‘all’ in the PSR. The PSR only demands explaining 
facts that satisfy the restriction. There is no demand to explain the rest. 
Explanation solutions respond to the conflict by attempting to explain 
essentialist facts. Unlike with exemption solutions, there is no need to restrict 
the scope of ‘all’ in the PSR. This avoids drawing an invidious distinction 
between facts that demand explanation and those that don’t. But it raises a 
new challenge to explain the essentialist facts. 
  Which solution a rationalist pursues depends in part on whether 
they are influenced by the Platonic or Aristotelian tradition. I don’t mean to 
suggest that either tradition requires one solution rather than another. It’s 
rather that a tradition might better promote one over another. As we will see, 
the Platonic tradition promotes exemption solutions, whereas the 
Aristotelian tradition promotes explanation solutions.  
 Exemption solutions 
Exemption solutions respond to the conflict by attempting to exempt 
essentialist facts from explanation. The key task for any exemption solution 
is to justify its restriction of the PSR. Without this justification, the restriction 
would not seem to cohere with the PSR itself.  
A natural way to justify a restriction assumes a sort of ought-implies-
can principle. The principle is that there can be a legitimate demand to 
explain a fact only if it can be explained. An exemption solution, then, will 
specify a class of facts which cannot be explained. This, together with the 
principle, entails that facts in this class do not demand explanation. They are 
exempt from the PSR, or just exempt for short. An unexplainable fact is not a 
                                                 
12 Exemption strategies have gone by other names. For instance, Della Rocca [2018] writes 
about strategies for taming the PSR. I think these are exemption strategies.  
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counterexample to the PSR if it is exempt. So the PSR needn’t consider them. 
This justifies restricting the PSR to the remaining facts.13 
An urgent question for exemption solutions is what makes exempt 
facts exempt. Without a good answer, exemption solutions appear to make ad 
hoc declarations that some facts do not demand explanation without saying 
why. Ironically, it might seem as if there must be a sufficient reason to 
demand explanations of some facts while exempting others from this 
demand. And if this is somehow exempt from the demand, one would like to 
hear a satisfying story as to why.  
One way to motivate exemption solutions is to see them as natural if 
not inevitable outgrowths of the Platonic approach to essence. On the 
Platonic approach, essences are like definitions or axioms. This can make 
essences seem as if they are somehow prior to the worldly circumstances. 
Essences are detached from the worldly facts which might ground them. This 
promotes if not requires an exemption solution. If essences are detached from 
the world, then they might seem beyond explanation. There is nothing in the 
world to explain them. And it might seem as if nothing else could explain 
them either. Detaching essences thus makes them seem exempt from the sort 
of explanation the PSR requires.  
Taking essences to be detached fits a common conception of essences 
as domain-fixers. To grasp this conception, let us first contrast it with Dasgupta 
[2016: 388-89]’s characterization of an alternative on which:    
...one starts with the idea that there are two ways to have a property—an 
essential way and an accidental way—and one then takes the essentialist 
fact about something to facts concerning which properties it has in the 
essential way. On this picture the essentialist facts are facts concerning 
which properties are had in that way by a given domain of things.  
But this conception of essences seems unable to make sense of how they fix 
the domain. Dasgupta [2016: 389] prefers a conception on which:  
                                                 
13 Perhaps there is an exemption solution at work in Kant’s claim that “the principle of 
sufficient reason, therefore, is the basis for possible experience” (Kant [1781/1997: B246]). 
Facts about possible experience demand explanation. Other facts (if there are any) do not. If 
among these other facts are essentialist facts, then they will be exempt. But I am unsure 
whether it is plausible to interpret Kant as having anything like these considerations in mind. 
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...the essentialist facts concern what those things are in the first place. It is 
not that there is some independently given domain and the essentialist 
facts are certain facts about what properties they have. It is rather that the 
essentialist facts specify what the domain is in the first place. It is those kinds 
of facts that strike me as autonomous.  
Essentialist facts primarily fix the domain. They only secondarily express 
properties essential to things in the domain. Accordingly, essentialist facts are 
detached from goings-on of objects having properties, standing in relations, 
and the like. Fine [2005: 349] expresses similar sentiments when he writes:  
The objects enter the world with their identity predetermined, as it were; 
and there is nothing in how things are that can have any bearing on what 
they are. 
Essentialist facts are somehow detached from the circumstances.  
  I will focus on two exemption solutions inspired by the domain-fixing 
conception of essence. Both strategies agree that essentialist facts somehow 
fix the domain. They differ over how this makes essentialist facts exempt.  
 The first strategy stems from Dasgupta’s remarks. It says that 
essentialist facts are exempt for being autonomous. Autonomous facts are not 
apt for explanation. There is no demand to explain facts not apt to be 
explained. Such facts are exempt.  
 The second strategy stems from Fine’s remarks. It says that essentialist 
facts are exempt for being transcendental. Transcendental facts do not hold 
because of the circumstances. They hold regardless. There is no demand to 
explain facts holding regardless of the circumstances. Such facts are exempt.  
These are not the only imaginable exemption solutions. But they seem 
to be the most promising. I will argue, however, that neither is promising. If 
there is a viable exemption solution, it is yet to be discovered.  
 Autonomy 
One exemption solution relies on the notion of autonomy. Following 
Dasgupta [2014,2016], we may distinguish between substantive and autonomous 
facts.  The exemption solution is that autonomous facts are exempt.  
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 This exemption solution relies on the distinction between substantive 
and autonomous facts. They differ over whether they apt or inapt for 
explanation.14 Substantive facts are those for which the question of what 
grounds them legitimately arises. Substantive facts are apt for ground. But the 
question does not legitimately arise for autonomous facts. As Dasgupta [2016: 
383] puts it, “the question as to why those underlying autonomous facts 
obtain does not even arise, and so there is no further question as to why the 
world turned out like this”. Autonomous facts are not apt for ground. This 
implies that they are not grounded. Autonomous facts are ungrounded. So 
they are not grounded in worldly facts. This provides a sense in which 
autonomous facts are detached.  
 Autonomous facts might seem exempt. It might be argued that they 
are exempt by way of an ought-implies-can principle: a fact demands 
explanation only if it can be explained. An autonomous fact is not apt for 
ground. So it cannot be grounded. By the principle, it follows that the 
autonomous fact does not demand explanation. It is therefore exempt.  
 A well-formulated PSR should be restricted only to substantive facts. 
This allows autonomous facts to explain substantive facts without themselves 
having or needing explanations. And that is what Dasgupta’s PSR says:   
PSR-Substantive  For every substantive fact S, there are some 
autonomous facts, the As, which ground S.  
A response to the conflict emerges. The PSR demands only that substantive 
facts have explanations. Autonomous facts are exempt. Essentialist facts are 
autonomous. So they are not counterexamples to the PSR.  
  There are several challenges to this response. A challenge might target 
the existence of autonomous facts. One might argue for their existence by way 
                                                 
14 The label ‘substantive’ is apt to mislead. The usual contrast to substantive is insubstantial. 
This has the innuendo that facts which are not substantive are somehow insubstantial. The 
innuendo extends to essentialist facts if they are not substantive. This is congenial to those 
who say the project of discovering essences is insubstantial. But it is not congenial to those 
who say the project is substantive and central to philosophy. Perhaps a less misleading (but 
clunkier) label would have been ‘mootable’ (i.e. open for discussion or debate).  
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of the services they offer. One of these might be to clarify physicalism by 
clarifying a certain scaffolding metaphor.15 Dasgupta [2014: 592] writes:  
…[O]ne can think of physicalism pictorially as a multi-story building, with 
physical facts on the first floor, chemical facts on the second floor, and so 
on. My view, I said, is that the ungrounded connections between the 
physical and the nonphysical are not part of the building itself but are the 
scaffolding around which the building is built. …The scaffolding that 
connects the floors consists in autonomous facts. They are not apt for 
grounding explanations and so do not appear on any particular floor of 
the building.  
There are other services too (Dasgupta [2016]). One might argue that the 
hypothesis of autonomous facts is serviceable, and that this is a reason to 
think it true.16 But this “true because serviceable” approach requires a 
comparative investigation of whether the services are needed or are better 
performed by other means. That is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 Even if we grant that there are autonomous facts, a second challenge 
arises. This challenge targets the autonomy of essentialist facts. Autonomous 
facts are ungrounded. If essentialist facts are autonomous, then they are also 
ungrounded. But perhaps not. Glazier [2017: 2880] argues that essentialist 
facts are grounded and therefore not autonomous. Later I will consider what 
might ground them (§5).   
 Even if we grant that essentialist facts are autonomous, a third 
challenge arises. This challenge targets the exemption of autonomous facts. 
Earlier we saw considerations supporting their exemption. Further clarifying 
autonomy should confirm them. But I will argue that it does not.17 
 There is more to autonomy than ungroundedness. The PSR prevents 
there being any ungrounded substantive facts. But nothing about 
ungroundedness by itself prevents substantiveness. An example of an 
ungrounded substantive fact might be the fact this isotope decayed when it 
did. What feature when added to an ungrounded fact makes it autonomous?  
                                                 
15 The scaffolding metaphor recalls young Wittgenstein [1921: 6.124]’s remarks about how 
the “propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it”.  
16 The claim echoes Lewis [1986: 3]. Dasgupta writes as if he endorses something like it.  
17 Glazier [2017] gives similar criticisms of autonomy. 
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 It is clear what it won’t be. It won’t be necessity. There can be 
necessary but ungrounded substantive facts. An example might be the fact 
that God exists, on certain theistic views. Nor is it analyticity. There can be 
analytic but ungrounded substantive facts. An example might be, again, that 
God exists, on certain versions of the ontological argument. Nor is it 
apriority. There can be apriori but ungrounded substantive facts. An example 
is that I exist, at least on certain Cartesian views of the self.  
 An analysis of autonomy would reveal what the feature is. But 
Dasgupta suspects autonomy is unanalyzable. He instead suggests taking 
autonomy as primitive. This does not prevent clarifying it in other ways.  
Autonomy might be clarified by modeling it on analogous notions. 
One model is causal explanation. Dasgupta [2016: 6] writes:  
The particle arrangement that happened to be the initial condition lacks 
a causal explanation even though it is a good question why those particles 
came to be arranged like that. The mathematical fact [1+2=3] by contrast 
lacks one because it is not “apt for being causally explained” in the first 
place. 
Just as the fact that 1+2=3 is not apt for causal explanation, so too 
autonomous facts are not apt for ground. 
But causal explanation is a poor model for autonomy. The reason why 
facts like 1+2=3 do not seem apt for causal explanation has no analogue for 
ground. To illustrate, suppose that every correct causal explanation is, or is 
backed by, a causal relation. For example, if throwing the rock causally explains 
the window’s shattering, then this causal explanation is, or is backed by, the 
throwing of the rock causing the window’s shattering. If there is to be a causal 
explanation of the fact that 1+2=3, then it will be, or will be backed by, 
something causing the fact that 1+2=3. But, presumably, nothing causes the 
fact that 1+2=3, at least in part because this fact is not an event, agent, or in 
space or time. It is not the sort of thing that can stand in causal relations. 
That’s why there can be no causal explanation of it. But this has no analogue 
for ground. If ground is a relation among facts, then the fact that 1+2=3 is 
precisely the sort of thing that can stand in relations of ground.  
Another model is definition. Even if it is legitimate to prove some 
axioms or theorems from others, not so for definitions. Were a student to ask 
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for a proof of a definition, one would reply that the student misunderstood 
its status as a definition. Definitions are not apt for proof. 
Definitions can be given in the formal mode. Formal definitions are 
given in a metalanguage. They are notational conventions or abbreviations for 
but not in an object language. For example, given a language of classical logic 
with only disjunction and negation, we may add a conditional with a formal 
definition: Let ‘A → B’ be defined as ‘A  B’. Then sentences of the form 
‘A → B’ abbreviate object language sentences of the form ‘A  B’. 
 But formal definitions are poor guides for autonomy. Granted, there 
is a sense in which they are not apt for proof. They are not even sentences in 
the object language. So they cannot be apt for proof within it. If they are 
sentences at all, they will or won’t be declarative. If not declarative, then they 
do not state facts. Sentences not stating facts are poor guides for autonomous 
facts. But if declarative, then they state facts (e.g. facts about how symbols can 
be used). If so, this reinforces, not undermines, their aptness for ground.  
Definitions can also be given in the material mode. They are given in 
an object language. As a result, they are apt for proof under familiar 
conceptions of proof. Any sensible syntactic conception of proof will validate 
proofs of ‘A’ from ‘A’. And any sensible semantic conception of proof will have 
‘A’ be true in all models in which ‘A’ is true.18 These proofs might be dull, 
trivial, inelegant, or uninformative. But they are valid proofs nonetheless.  
One might characterize a sense of proof in which definitions are not 
apt for proof. This sense might be that of an explanatory proof. Roughly put, 
an explanatory proof is a proof that is neither dull, trivial, inelegant, nor 
uninformative. For example, a proof might be explanatory because it 
elegantly—perhaps even beautifully—illuminates why an interesting 
consequence of the axioms follows from them in a way that guides how to 
construct other proofs of other interesting consequences. Perhaps, then, 
definitions are not apt for explanatory proofs.  
What makes a definition inapt for explanatory proof? One answer is 
that a definition is inapt if it is self-evident. There are many controversies over 
self-evidence. In the present context, we might look to Frege for inspiration. 
                                                 
18 This is compatible with the dialetheist’s allowance that ‘A’ also be true in those models.  
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For Frege, self-evidence is an epistemic notion. It concerns the justification 
of a proposition. Frege also thinks self-evidence is a cognitive notion. It 
concerns the content of a proposition. Propositions are self-evident when, 
according to Burge [1998], “their justification is carried in their own 
contents”. A self-evident definition is inapt for explanatory proof because it 
already contains its own explanation. 
One might take this as a model for autonomy. An autonomous fact is 
inapt for ground because it already contains its own explanation. Now there 
is a question of how to interpret ‘explanation’.  
If ‘explanation’ means ground, then the claim is that an autonomous 
fact is inapt for ground because it already contains its own ground. But that 
is not what Dasgupta has in mind. His view aside, the model implies that an 
autonomous fact grounds itself. That violates the irreflexivity of ground.  
Perhaps then ‘explanation’ means something else. For example, it 
might be that an autonomous fact is inapt for ground because it somehow 
already contains its own justification.19 But now the difficulty is that this 
makes autonomy an epistemic notion.  
Autonomy is supposed to be a metaphysical notion. Although 
Dasgupta [2016: 387] admits to “glossing the notion [autonomy] in epistemic 
or cognitive terms”, he insists that “autonomy is not defined in epistemic or 
cognitive terms”. The glosses are supposed to be relevant because they signal 
the metaphysical notion of autonomy. But our considerations suggest 
otherwise. The point is not that autonomy must be purified of any 
epistemic/cognitive traces. It is rather to see how epistemic/cognitive glosses 
reveal anything about the facts themselves and not just our 
epistemic/cognitive relations to them. Asking what, if anything, grounds a 
fact might feel illegitimate in many ways. It might seem insubstantial because 
the fact is necessary or analytic or apriori or otherwise trivial. Or it might 
seem pointless because it is obvious that the fact has certain grounds or else 
that it has none. Or it might seem flummoxing because we don’t know how 
to approach it. But none of this implies that the fact itself somehow prevents 
the question even from arising.  
                                                 
19 This might be related to Boghossian [1996]’s notion of epistemic analyticity.  
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This raises a difficulty in principle for autonomy’s relevance to the 
PSR. Autonomy resisted our attempts at clarification. Even if it could be 
clarified, it would still only concern our epistemic/cognitive relations to the 
facts and not the facts themselves. But then the autonomy of a fact is not a 
relevant justification for exemption from our metaphysical PSR.     
 Transcendence 
Another exemption solution relies directly on the domain-fixing conception 
of essences. Dasgupta associated autonomy with the domain-fixing 
conception of essences. This might mislead one into conflating them. But 
they are different. Nothing in the domain-fixing conception requires 
autonomy. The question of ground is abstract and general. It may target any 
fact and ask what, if anything, grounds it. This question is indifferent to which 
fact is targeted. It is indifferent to whether the targeted fact fixes a domain or 
expresses a property. So taking essentialist facts to be domain-fixing does not 
make it inapt to ask what, if anything, grounds them.  
Pruning autonomy from the domain-fixing conception avoids its 
problems. But it also prunes its justification for exemption. What justifies 
exempting domain-fixing facts, if not their autonomy?  
 One answer is that domain-fixing facts somehow “transcend” the 
circumstances involving the things they are about. This idea, or something 
near enough, seems implicit in Fine [2005: 348-49] when he writes:  
...the identity of an object is independent of how things turn out...it is the 
core essential features of the object that will be independent of how things 
turn out and they will be independent in the sense of holding regardless of 
the circumstances, not whatever the circumstances. 
Here Fine distinguishes between holding because of the circumstances as 
opposed to regardless of the circumstances.20 This distinction can help 
                                                 
20 Almog [1989] discusses a related distinction between lordly and worldly perspectives on 
logical truths. This relates to the debate over whether logic is the most universal science. 
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characterize another exemption solution.21 Its key idea is to exempt facts that 
hold regardless of the circumstances.  
This exemption solution relies on the distinction between worldly 
and unworldly (or transcendental) facts.22 To a first approximation, a worldly 
fact holds because of the circumstances, whereas an unworldly (or transcendental) 
fact holds regardless of the circumstances. Fine [2005: 338-39] writes:  
…[Socrates’s] being a man is an unworldly matter. It is something that 
holds ‘off-stage’, regardless of how things turn out; and so, in particular, it 
is something that holds regardless of whether or not he exists. Thus it is 
not that he is possibly a man despite his not existing. His existence or non-
existence is simply irrelevant to his possible status as a man; and all that 
the possibility of his being a man and not existing comes down to is the 
genuine possibility of his not existing and the unworldly, or circumstance-
indifferent, fact that he is a man. 
Fine suggests that this distinction is like the more familiar eternal/sempiternal 
distinction. Eternal facts are tenseless statements true regardless of the time, 
whereas sempiternal facts are tensed statements true at every time. The 
difference emerges in an asymmetry in temporal predication. Consider: 
SI    Socrates is self-identical. 
SH   Socrates is human.23 
SE    Socrates exists. 
A sempiternal statement allows temporalizing (‘once existed’). But an eternal 
statement does not (‘once was self-identical/ human’): 
SI*   # Socrates once was self-identical. 
SH*  # Socrates once was human. 
SE*    Socrates once existed. 
                                                 
21 Fine gives no indication of considering an exemption solution of this sort. 
22 Fine [2005] writes about transcendental truths, rather than facts. But the difference 
shouldn’t matter here. See Kuhn [forthcoming] for further discussion of transcendence. 
23 Fine’s actual example is ‘Socrates is a man’. But it is clear he means human by ‘man’. I 
have adjusted Fine’s example accordingly. It is important that the predicate ‘human’ not be 
read as ‘existent human’, which is a worldly predicate (cf. Fine [2005: 337]). 
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This illustrates how a sempiternal fact turns on the time, whereas an eternal 
fact holds regardless of the time. Analogously, SI/SH are transcendental because 
they are true regardless of the circumstances, whereas SE is worldly because its 
truth turns on the circumstances. 
 More should be said about the worldly/transcendental distinction. 
But let us help ourselves to it for now. Let us suppose that essentialist facts 
are transcendental. How might this help justify their exemption?   
 One might seek inspiration from autonomy’s justification for 
exemption. Earlier we saw how autonomy combined with an ought-implies-
can principle to justify restricting the scope of the PSR. Autonomous facts 
cannot be grounded. So the PSR ought not demand their explanation. That 
justified restricting the PSR to substantive facts. Analogously, transcendental 
facts do not hold because of the circumstances. They cannot have any worldly 
grounds. This, combined with an ought-implies-can principle, entails that 
transcendental facts do not demand explanation, at least not from worldly 
facts. Perhaps that justifies restricting the scope of the PSR to worldly facts.  
But the analogy is weak. Even if transcendental facts do not demand 
explanation from worldly facts, it does not follow that they are unexplained. 
On the contrary, some transcendental facts have explanations. For example, 
conjunctive facts are explained by their conjuncts. This includes the 
conjunction of two transcendental facts. Such a conjunction will also be a 
transcendental fact. So it is a transcendental fact with an explanation.  
These considerations undermine drawing inspiration from 
autonomy. Justifying the exemption of autonomous facts relies on their being 
ungrounded. Were an autonomous grounded, it would be apt for ground. 
We just saw how a transcendental conjunction is grounded in its 
transcendental conjuncts. This conjunction is apt for ground. It is therefore 
not autonomous. So the justification of exempting autonomous facts does 
not carry over to exempting transcendental facts.  
These considerations also undermine relying on transcendence for an 
exemption solution. Some transcendental facts can have grounds. So there 
won’t be any general illegitimacy in asking what, if anything, grounds a 
transcendental fact. But then it seems that nothing about a fact’s being 
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transcendent makes it exempt. Transcendence by itself does not justify 
exemption. If it contributes at all to exempting a fact, it is only with help.  
 Explanation solutions 
Explanation solutions respond to the conflict by attempting to explain 
essentialist facts. But it is not altogether clear how they might be explained. 
So the key task is to provide the explanations.  
I will consider some approaches toward explaining essentialist facts. 
These differ over what they take the grounds of the essentialist facts to be.24 
My aim is not to be comprehensive but suggestive. My main suggestion is that 
the last approach is least developed but most deserving of development.  
 Theistic explanations 
Theistic explanations of essence were once prominent. For example,  Spinoza 
[1988: 1P25; 1P33S1] accepts the demand to explain the essences of things. 
He also attempts to meet the demand. Spinoza says God is “the cause of the 
essence of things”. God explains the essentialist facts.  
But theistic explanations are no longer as prominent as they were. 
Even those who wish to give a theistic explanation of essentialist facts might 
admit that nothing in rationalism or essentialism itself requires the appeal to 
theism. One might therefore suppose that if essentialist facts can be explained 
at all, their explanations would have to be secular and available to theists and 
non-theists alike. For this reason, I will focus on secular explanations. 
 A secular explanation can be given within the Platonic tradition. This 
would involve identifying some transcendental facts to explain the essentialist 
facts. A natural idea is that they are the essentialist facts themselves. So some 
essentialist facts would explain others. But this risks a familiar infinite regress 
of explanation. It is controversial whether such an infinite regress would be 
                                                 
24 Alleged cases of grounded essentialist facts are relevant to the discussion of autonomy 
(§4.1). Any such case will be a counterexample to the autonomy of essentialist facts. 
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vicious.25 Until that controversy is resolved, one might hope to explain 
essentialist facts by other means. It is, however, hard to see what other kind 
of transcendental facts might explain essentialist facts.   
 These considerations might suggest that secular explanations are 
more at home within the Aristotelian tradition. Indeed, the Aristotelian 
tradition promotes if not requires an explanation solution. If essences are 
embedded in the world, then they cannot be exempted for being detached. It 
is unclear how else they could be exempted. So it seems that embedding 
essences makes them apt for explanation, which will be worldly.  
But worldly explanations of essence might seem incoherent to those 
gripped by the domain-fixing conception of essence. How could essentialist 
facts fix the identities of items prior to the worldly circumstances involving 
them if these facts hold because of the worldly circumstances? A satisfying 
answer might seem unattainable. And so one might conclude that the 
domain-fixing conception does not cohere with the Aristotelian tradition.  
This conclusion seems premature. One may concede that the 
Aristotelian tradition conflicts with some of the metaphorical descriptions of 
the domain-fixing conception. This, however, does not show that it conflicts 
with the conception itself. It remains to be seen whether worldly 
circumstances can explain essentialist facts and thereby fix the domain. In 
what follows, I will briefly consider two approaches to doing so.  
 Anti-realist explanations 
One worldly approach to explaining essences is “anti-realist”. This approach 
explains essences in terms of facts about our language, concepts, or 
conventions.26 These anthropocentric facts, if you will, ground essentialist facts.  
Nothing about the approach specifies which or how anthropocentric 
facts ground essentialist facts. One variant takes essentialist facts to be 
grounded in anthropocentric facts about our concepts. Another variant takes 
                                                 
25 Some essays in Bliss and Priest [2018] consider whether such infinite regress are vicious.  
26 Cf. Glazier [2017: 2879]. 
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essentialist facts to be grounded in linguistic facts about definitions or 
analytic truths.27 A third variant takes essentialist facts to be grounded in 
anthropocentric facts that are “non-factual” in Fine [2001]’s sense. Perhaps 
there are other variants as well.   
The anti-realist approach and its variants belong to a venerable 
tradition. But it is a tradition I will set aside. This is because the anti-realist 
approach appears to yield only nominal essences. This is often by design. The 
point is to avoid real essences. And even when that is not the point, the 
challenge remains how the anti-realist approach could yield anything but 
nominal essences. Whatever the point, our focus has been on real essences. 
It is unclear how the anti-realist approach could accommodate them. So my 
focus will remain on approaches more accommodating to real essences.  
 Generative explanations 
One such approach is inspired by Almog’s conception of natures or 
essences.28 The conception changes and evolves over several articles (Almog 
[1991,1996,1999,2003,2010]). In them, Almog often describes his conception 
as ‘worldly’. But it should not be assumed that he means by ‘worldly’ what 
Fine means. Nevertheless, Almog’s meaning seems similar enough to be 
relevant here. So I will explore how his conception of worldly essences might 
be developed in service of an explanation solution.29   
Almog’s idea is that essences are produced by “generative cosmic 
processes” (Almog [2010]). Almog does not say precisely what a generative 
cosmic process is. But he does say enough to give a rough gloss. First, a 
generative cosmic process is a process. It is a sequence of events or 
circumstances. Second, it is cosmic. The sequence’s constituent events or 
circumstances are part of this cosmos, the actual cosmos. That makes them 
worldly. Third, it is generative. The sequence’s constituent events or 
                                                 
27 Perhaps these linguistic facts are grounded in mental facts about the intentions of speakers, 
as suggested by the Gricean Program to explain sentence meaning by speaker meaning. 
28 Almog tends to prefer the term ‘natures’ over ‘essences’. But I will use ‘essences’.  
29 I do not attribute any of the claims I explore to Almog. This is in part because he does not 
discuss the PSR and also in part because I am not always sure how to interpret his views. 
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circumstances somehow conspire to produce items. It would seem then that 
essences produced by generative cosmic processes will be embedded.30 
This characterization of a generative cosmic process is abstract. It does 
not specify any particular generative cosmic processes or what they generate. 
But Almog suggests some examples. A familiar process involving a particular 
human sperm and egg produced Socrates. Another familiar process involving 
the set-builder operation produced the singleton set {Socrates}.31 Various 
chemical processes produce molecules. In general, Almog believes that what 
things are—the natures or essences of things—results from generative cosmic 
processes of one sort or another.  
One can adapt these points to the present context. Given that a 
generative cosmic process transpired, we may posit the fact that it did. Such 
a fact is a generative fact. A generative fact captures the worldly circumstances 
producing an essence. We may understand production as ground. Then a 
generative fact concerning some item grounds a corresponding essentialist 
fact about that item. Call this the generative approach to essences.  
The generative approach provides an explanation solution. 
Generative facts ground essentialist facts. So essentialist facts are explained. 
Their generative grounds explain them. Call this the generative solution.  
Our statement of the generative solution is abstract. It does not 
specify any particular generative facts or the essentialist facts they ground. But 
there is a general recipe yielding examples. The recipe begins with a generative 
cosmic process. Then there will be the generative fact that this process 
obtained. Finally, the generative fact is taken to ground an essentialist fact.  
The recipe can be illustrated by applying it to one of the cases above. 
Start with the process of forming Socrates from particular human sperm and 
egg. Then there will be the generative fact that this process obtained. Finally, 
this generative fact grounds the fact that Socrates is essentially human. The 
recipe can be applied to the other cases from above as well. 
                                                 
30 Indeed, Almog [2010: 360] uses the term ‘re-embed’ when describing a similar view. 
31 This might puzzle those who think of sets as abstract but interpret ‘cosmic’ as implying 
concrete. But Almog seems to think that sets are no less cosmic than Socrates (Almog [1999]). 
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The generative approach can be further illustrated by considering its 
applications to other domains. I’ll briefly consider four: 
First, fictional entities. Suppose they have essences. Perhaps James 
Bond is essentially British. One might think that fictional entities are 
produced by processes involving the intentions and activities of authors.32 If 
so, the generative facts that these processes obtain might then ground the 
essentialist facts about fictional entities.  
Second, artifacts. Suppose they have essences. Perhaps scissors are 
essentially for cutting. One might think that artifacts are produced by 
processes involving the intentions and activities of inventors and 
craftspeople.33 If so, the generative facts that these processes obtain might 
then ground the essentialist facts about artifacts.  
Third, social items. Suppose they have essences. Perhaps women are 
essentially oppressed.34 One might think that social items are produced by 
processes involving the collective activities and intentions of individuals.35 If 
so, the generative facts that these processes obtain might then ground the 
essentialist facts about social items.       
Fourth, mathematical objects. Suppose they have essences. Perhaps 
the number two is essentially prime. One might think that mathematical 
objects are produced by processes involving the activities of mathematicians.36 
If so, the generative facts that these processes obtain might then ground the 
essentialist facts about mathematical objects.  
These sketchy remarks about the generative approach fall far short of 
a theory. Still, they offer a glimpse of what a theory might be. Further 
                                                 
32 For similar views on fictional entities, see Evnine [2016], Fine [1982], Kripke [2013],  
Salmon [2005], Schiffer [2003], Thomasson [1999], and van Inwagen [2001]. 
33 For similar views on artifacts, see Baker [2008], Evnine [2016], Hilpinen [2011], Raven 
[2018], and Thomasson [2014]. 
34 A view of this sort is developed and defended by Haslanger [2012]. 
35 For similar views on social items, see Epstein [2015], Passinsky [2016], Ritchie [2015], Searle 
[1995], Smith [2001], Smith and Varzi [2000], Sveinsdóttir [2008], and Thomasson [2003]. 
36 Views of this sort are discussed in some of the papers in Benacerraf and Putnam [1983]. 
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developing it will involve confronting various difficulties. I will mention a few 
to give a sense of the challenges that await.  
One difficulty is to identify the genuine essence-generating cosmic 
processes. Some might allow every cosmic process to generate an essence. The 
result is a plenitude of essences. Others might find this plenitude 
objectionable. They might try to avoid it by distinguishing between cosmic 
processes which do and those which do not generate essences. But what 
accounts for the difference? One might wish to appeal to the essence itself to 
identify a process as essence-generating. But this might seem circular or 
otherwise unilluminating. Nor is it clear how else to identify it.37  
Another difficulty is to account for the modal force of essences. The 
modal force is that essence implies necessity. If some item essentially has a 
feature, then it cannot lack that feature. Given that essences are generated by 
contingent actual cosmic processes, then it might seem as if these contingencies 
would also have to generate the necessities implied by essence. But one might 
doubt whether contingencies can account for these necessities.38  
There are other difficulties awaiting the generative approach as well. 
Further developing it is needed to assess whether it can overcome them. But 
that is a task for another occasion.  
                                                 
37 It might appear that there is a related difficulty of “meta-ground”. Suppose an essentialist 
fact E has certain grounds G. What, if anything, grounds the fact that G grounds E? Some 
have held the view that essentialist facts help ground such facts about ground (Rosen [2010]; 
Dasgupta [2016]). They might expect E to help ground the fact that G grounds E. One might 
think this implies that E helps ground itself, thereby violating the irreflexivity of ground. But 
there is no such implication. It does not follow from E’s helping ground G that E grounds 
itself. Much like necessity ((A  B)) does not distribute over disjunction (A  B), so too 
grounds (E) do not distribute over connections of ground (G grounds E). [REDACTED] 
pointed out to me that there is a genuine difficulty if one thinks essentialist facts somehow 
“back” grounding explanations (without being among the grounds). For then it seems the 
essentialist fact will back its own explanation, which may seem illegitimate.  
38 The force of this worry depends on distinguishing between C explaining N (where C is 
contingent and N is necessary) and C explaining N. Our focus is on the second case. 
Wildman [2018] argues that some contingencies can explain necessities in this sense. 
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 Conclusion 
I wish to draw two tentative conclusions. The first conclusion is that 
exemption solutions are unpromising. This is an indirect argument for 
explanation solutions. The second conclusion is that prospects for an 
explanation solution turn on developing a viable generative approach to 
explaining essences. If it can be done, it would vindicate the combination of 
rationalism and essentialism. And if not, it would seem to make the 
combination untenable. Either way, the agenda is set for defending the 
combination as well as the more general project of explaining essences.39  
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